During the planning phase to begin the war in Iraq, the planners (eggheads) at Central Command (Centcom) developed several courses of action that the Coalition Forces could encounter.  I don’t remember all of them in detail, but most of them covered different nuances of how the Iraqi Army would fight us.

Fairly late in the planning process, a new course of action appeared.  We were initially told that there was a remote chance that the entire Iraqi regime could collapse as soon as the invasion was underway.  This “remote” course of action was called Early Regime Collapse (ERC).  At first, we just reviewed our plans to ensure that we could account for massive amounts of prisoners if the Iraqi Army surrendered en masse.

Then the Army began issuing cards and handouts describing the procedures for organizing Iraqi infantry or tank battalion after they surrendered.  We began developing our own courses of action that were predicated upon the Iraqi Army giving up.  Before long, ERC became the de facto plan for the invasion of Iraq.  I’m sure that there were exceptions, and most of the squads and platoons were ready to fight.  At the higher level of brigades and division though, the Iraqi Army had all but surrendered before we even crossed the berm.  I actually felt a little disappointed that the war was over…and I was still in Kuwait.  War was a total bummer.

Once the invasion was underway, we didn’t get into any huge firefights right away.  But we didn’t take any prisoners either.  We saw lots of military aged males who were in civilian clothes, but no uniforms.  What we would soon realize is that the Iraqi Regime wouldn’t collapse like the Centcom planners thought.  And they didn’t fight us the way we thought they would.  The fights in Nasiriyah and Hillah were indicators of things to come.

Why is any of this important?  The simple mistake made during pre-invasion planning was developing a plan (a course of action) that centered on how the enemy would react.  Leaders within the law enforcement community, specifically trainers, should heed the lesson here.  In a violent struggle between men, there isn’t a reliable way to predict the behavior of your assailant.

Think of how you currently train to deal with violent assault.  Not how you think, or plan.  How do you train?  Do you train to read, assess, and act?  To observe, orient, decide, then act?  Or do you talk about the OODA loop, then train to fire a certain number of rounds at a paper target from a pre-determined distance from a static position during daylight hours?  If you think a gunfight unfolds like a choreographed Kabuki theater, you’re setting yourself up for an expectation shortfall.  You will be surprised and possibly killed because your attacker did not stand still and act like a paper target.

Do you train to confront active shooters?  How did you develop your tactics?  Do you believe that the “profile” of an active shooter or terrorist will determine how they react to law enforcement?  Do you train your officers to solve tactical problems, or do you teach them techniques that they will use.

For years, teaching tactics ad nauseum from the latest “expert” was the norm.  It’s time to break from choreography and begin teaching principles-based realistic training.  Law enforcement officers don’t need to be taught what to think about a situation, they need to be taught how to think tactically and solve problems.

Don’t be guilty of planning for Early Regime Collapse.  There aren’t any guarantees during a violent encounter.  Jedburgh has developed the most innovative training programs available anywhere.  Based on years of personal combat experience by Special Forces, our firearms training is firmly grounded in the realities of modern gunfighting.

We’d like to opportunity to train with you or your agency.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com for scheduling.

Professional law enforcement and the armed citizen share the same challenges as the athlete.  You obviously want to have a full and complete set of skills to defend yourself from a violent attack.  While there is some risk of over-training, I suspect the majority of us should be more concerned with a lack of preparedness.  If you knew the date, time, and circumstances of the fight for your life I assume that you’d either: a) not be there, or b) prepare to fight.

The problem, of course, is that you don’t know when you’ll be assaulted.  Athletes know when they’ll perform, and the games they play have well defined rules and even referees.

Armed professionals have to be ready to play on any given day, at any time, regardless of the weather.  There are no rules to surviving an assault, and there will not be a referee to adjudicate.  There is only surviving – or getting killed.

But how do we find the balance between training and our daily lives?  We can’t simply train constantly.  I think the problem is two-fold.  First, we don’t train enough.  And second, we don’t maximize our training time.

Like all truly complex subjects, it sounds simple.  Train more and train better (train more better?).  But how do we build a world-class training program that maximizes our chances of survival while balancing our duties to our families and communities?  I propose that we use the same scientific approach that professional athletes use.

One of the key components to a successful training program is to ensure that the desired skills are transferred into the student’s long-term memory.  Once the teach, coach, mentor cycle of traditional training is complete, how do we measure skill transfer?

To measure training success, place the student under stress.  Bar is a unit of measure roughly equal to the atmospheric pressure of the Earth at sea level.  Simulated stress using accelerated heart rate, timed drills, and other stressors will allow an effective assessment of both the students performance, and the efficacy of your training program.  Under increased pressure, the problems or shortfalls in your training paradigm will be exaggerated.

The Jedburgh Hi Bar Training™ concept proposes to meet this need.  Whether the training covers firearms or tactics, we have developed a method of instruction to successfully transfer skills to the student, followed by a stress-filled evaluation designed to objectively determine whether learning has been achieved.

If your training program is still using qualification standards to measure performance, you aren’t preparing your officers to survive a violent assault.  Jedburgh has developed the most innovative training programs available anywhere.  Based on years of personal combat experience by Special Forces, our firearms training is firmly grounded in the realities of modern gunfighting.

We’d like to opportunity to train with you or your agency.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com for scheduling.

As the medevac chopper landed the wounded were examined one by one. Staff Sergeant Benavidez could only hear what was going on around him. He had over thirty seven puncture wounds. His intestines were exposed. He could not see as his eyes were caked in blood and unable to open. Neither could he speak, his jaw broken, clubbed by a North Vietnamese rifle. But he knew what was happening, and it was the scariest moment of his life, even more so than the earlier events of the day. He lay in a body bag, bathed in his own blood. Jerry Cottingham, a friend screamed “That’s Benavidez. Get a doc”. When the doctor arrived he placed his hand on Roy’s chest to feel for a heartbeat. He pronounced him dead. The physician shook his head. ”There’s nothing I can do for him.” As the doctor bent over to zip up the body bag. Benavidez did the only thing he could think of to let the doctor know that he was alive. He spit in the doctor’s face. The surprised doctor reversed Roy’s condition from dead to ”He won’t make it, but we’ll try”.

Roy Benavidez fought his whole life.  His father died when he was three years old from tuberculosis.  His mother remarried, but she too was taken by the disease when he was only eight.  He moved to El Campo, Texas to be raised by grandparents and extended family.  He worked at the bus station shining shoes, and worked on local farms.  At 15, he dropped out of school to work full time supporting his family.

He enlisted in the Texas National Guard in 1952, then in the regular Army in 1955.  He completed airborne training and was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in 1959, the same year he married his wife Hilaria.  In 1965, he was sent to South Vietnam as an advisor to an ARVN infantry unit.  During his tour, he was grievously wounded when he stepped on a landmine.  Doctors feared he would never walk again.  Not only did he walk out of the hospital the next year, he graduated from Special Forces training and was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group.  He returned to Vietnam in January of 1968 as a member of Detachment B-56.

The 2nd of May 1968 started like most days.  A 12-man reconnaissance team was inserted into an area controlled by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).  The team confirmed large enemy activity in the area shortly after insertion.  Within a  short time, the team made contact with a battalion-sized NVA element (approximately 300 men).  Staff Sergeant Benavidez was monitoring the radio in the Forward Operating Base.  He listened intently as the team requested an emergency extraction.  The rescue helicopters were able to locate the team, but unable to extract them.  The NVA battalion fired furiously at the helicopters.  The enemy knew this was their chance to finally kill members of the highly elite Studies and Observation Group (SOG).

When the damaged helicopters returned to the Forward Operating Base, SSG Benavidez voluntarily boarded an aircraft for a second attempt at extracting the beleaguered Special Forces team.  Once in the area, he realized that the team would not be able to move on their own to the helicopters.  He instructed the pilot to land 75 meters from the team then jumped to the ground to assist the team.  While enroute, he was shot in the leg and received additional wounds to the head and face.

He prepared the team for movement while notifying the helicopters for immediate extraction.  SSG Benavidez then carried over half the wounded team to the waiting aircraft.  He made a final trip to recover classified documents from the deceased team leader, and was wounded in the back from an enemy hand grenade.  Before he could return to the aircraft, the pilot was mortally wounded and the helicopter crashed.

He raced back to the wreckage to organize the survivors into a defensive perimeter.  He directed the fire of the team, while calling in close air support danger close.  He called for another extraction before being shot again in the thigh.  Despite heavy loss of blood, he carried a fellow soldier to the arriving aircraft.  On the way, he was attacked and clubbed in the face by an enemy soldier’s bayonet.  SSG Benavidez fought with the soldier before killing him with his knife despite receiving multiple bayonet wounds.

On the way to the Forward Operating Base, SSG Benavidez was pronounced killed in action, though he would survive his injuries.  In all, he suffered 37 bullet, fragmentation and bayonet wounds.  He spent the next several years recovering from his wounds.  He was initially awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, but it was later upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 1981.

Roy Benavidez died in his home state of Texas on November 29th, 1998.  This country’s proud military history was written by men like Roy Benavidez.

He truly is a Hero, a Stud, a Gunfighter, and a Champion.

It was a wet Spring morning in Washington, D.C. Tim McCarthy of the US Secret Service had the day off. At the last moment, a request came down for an additional agent to help protect newly-elected President Ronald Reagan. Special Agent McCarthy and a co-worker flipped a coin to see who’s day off would be ruined. Tim McCarthy lost.

And so on Monday, March 30th, 1981 Tim McCarthy would accompany President Reagan to a speech he was giving at the Hilton Hotel just across town in DC. The Secret Service decided to forego the presidential body armor, the “Iron Underwear,” because the President would only be exposed for 30 feet between the car and the building.

The speech was uneventful, and the crowd only managed to generate polite applause for the new President. He’d only been in office 69 days, and the Union Leaders of the AFL-CIO weren’t sure how the conservative Reagan would support their cause.

Unbeknownst to President Reagan or the Secret Service, a disturbed young man named John Hinckley Jr. had infiltrated the press line with a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. Hinckley was convinced that if he generated enough spectacle out of killing President Reagan, the love of his life actress Jodie Foster would understand how he felt about her.

Hinckley had previously attempted to assassinate President Jimmy Carter, Reagan’s predecessor. President Carter had changed his schedule at the last minute during the campaign, and Hinckley never got his chance.

Jerry Parr, in the raincoat, President Reagan waving, and Tim McCarthy on the far right moments before the assassination attempt.

As President Reagan approached the big black limousine, Hinckley fired his pistol rapidly triggering six shots in three seconds. As soon as the shooting started, the Secret Service executed their precise drill to protect the President. Jerry Parr threw Reagan bodily into the vehicle and lay on top of him to protect him from the incoming fire. Tim McCarthy, seeing the shooter, stepped between the pistol and the president and spread his arms and legs as wide as possible to shield Reagan as he was being evacuated.

Tim McCarthy shot protecting President Reagan

Tim Mccarthy was shot in the chest for his heroism.  There were many heroes that day.  Both the Secret Service and the Washington D.C. Police performed well  in the conduct of their duties.  The President’s Secretary, James Brady was badly hurt, along with officer Thomas Delahanty.  President Reagan was also wounded by a ricochet.

It is awe-inspiring to watch a trained and capable professional execute his duties when everything is on the line.  I’ve seen it a few times in my life, and it always renews my sense of respect for the American fighting man.  Tim McCarthy knew that he couldn’t possibly draw his weapon in time to stop Hinckley.  He used the only weapon left to him.  He not only displayed his exceptional courage to Hinckley, but to the entire world.  What men are these of the United States Secret Service!

Tim McCarthy is a Hero, Stud, Gunfighter, and a Champion.

If you have a nominee for a hero, send the details to info@Jedburgh-USA.com.

We have long discussed the statistics and circumstances of law enforcement performance during lethal encounters.  There are usually two directions that the discussion takes, based primarily on the author’s perspective.  Either training is the primary animator, or the psychological and physiological impact of the incident leads to poor performance.

Since Jedburgh is a training outfit, you can guess what side of the fence I come down on. What may not be obvious is that our firearms training is less about weapons than it is about people.  Let me share with you what are considered the SOF Truths.  The original author is actually a non-SOF retired Army Colonel named John Collins, who was nonetheless a smart guy and whose SOF Truths remain as valid today as when he wrote them in 1987 for a Congressional Report.

• Humans are more important than hardware
• Quality is better than quantity
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
• Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur

While these were written for very specific military units, it doesn’t take much imagination to apply these truths to law enforcement units, departments or agencies.  In my opinion, the truths are fundamentals that can be applied to any profession.  Here are the Jedburgh Training Truths ©:

• The man is the weapon, the weapons are just tools
• A quality professional is better than a quantity of  amateurs
• Training must be tailored to each individual to deliver perfect performance
• A core of professional competence must be constantly maintained

These truths permeate our training mindset and our entire approach to business.  You can’t train firearms effectively without training the whole man.  Understanding how the human brain learns and processes information, the psychological impact of violence, and the realities of modern combat are essential to building a world class program.  Training time must be devoted to Mindset, Weapon Manipulations (Marksmanship), and Tactics in equal measures.

Combat Triad

There are plenty of indications that our current approach to training needs to be modified.  In the last ten years, there has not been any appreciable improvement in the number of law enforcement officers killed, or even the hit probability of officers involved in shootings.

Did you know that there is no correlation between how well an officer qualifies and the probability of the same officer hitting his intended target in a gunfight?  There is some isolated data that indicates a slightly positive correlation, but when you factor in the small population and high standard deviation you end up with statistically insignificant results.

The standards we use to determine accuracy and proficiency with the use of firearms does not indicate either when the officer is fighting for his life.

We need to develop a comprehensive and holistic approach to firearms training.  The entire training paradigm requires modification to field the most professional police force possible.  It will save lives.

Don’t train on what you want.  Train on what you need.  Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive firearms training available anywhere.  It was built on the vast personal combat experience of some of the most elite special operators in the country.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Metallica – Hero of the Day (In order to experience the full, multi-media experience you should listen to the music while you read).

The Miami Shootout of April 11, 1986 had a far-reaching impact on law enforcement.  I’m not going to describe the event in blow-by-blow, dramatic prose.  I’m not even going to talk about revolvers, or 9mm ammo (or 10mm  ammo), or inter-agency coordination.  If you want to dig in to the story of the Miami Shootout, you can download the FBI report here – Miami Shootout (249).  There are other excellent resources (and some that are not-so-excellent).  But if you want to take a serious look, start with the FBI’s report.

I only want to talk about one man from a group of incredibly brave men.  His name is Edmundo Mireles Jr. and his heroic actions during the ferocious firefight undoubtedly saved lives.

The summary of the situation is that six FBI Special Agents were attempting to affect the arrest of two suspected bank robbers.  The Special Agents (SAs) traveled in several vehicles while both suspects traveled in the same vehicle.  In the opening seconds of the ensuing car crash and gunfight, numerous rounds were fired from both sides with at least one SA wounded.  SA Mireles and his partner SA Hanlon moved from their vehicle across the street in order to assist.  SA Mireles was immediately shot in the left forearm by one the suspects.  SA Mireles was dazed and/or unconscious for the next several moments.  In redneck-speak, “he got his chickens scattered.”

When he regained his faculties, he realized that three of his fellow SAs were down  and the suspects were attempting to steal an FBI sedan and run over SA Hanlon who was lying grievously wounded behind the rear tire.  With his ruined left arm hanging at his side, SA Mireles forced himself to a sitting position and balanced his shotgun on the rear bumper of the car he was using for cover and engaged the suspects.  After each shot, SA Mireles would carefully lower the shotgun between his legs and work the action with his one good arm.  He fired until the shotgun was empty.

SA Mireles was determined to end the violent battle.  He staggered to his feet and advanced toward the suspects.  He drew his service revolver from his belt as one of the suspects engaged him with pistol fire.  He fired all six of his rounds, scoring five hits.  Both suspects were killed at the scene.

On an otherwise routine day conducting routine law enforcement work, these men from the FBI fought for their lives against determined attackers.  In broad daylight in a neighborhood in South Florida, SA Mireles faced the Beast.

Ed Mireles is a Hero, Stud, Gunfighter, and a Champion.  May we all acquit ourselves so well.

But I’ve had people review my situation reports, planning, or actions on the objective.  From the perspective of the review-ee and not the review-er, it didn’t feel “academically valuable” it just felt like Monday-morning quarterback syndrome.  To make it absolutely clear, I thought it was chickenshit.

In order to avoid having to give myself that title, I’m going to devote some time to identifying and recognizing the Heroes, Studs, Gunfighters, & Champions of the professional military and law enforcement communities.

If you have a nominee, shoot me an email with the particulars and I’ll do some research, or write it up yourself and I’ll post it here.

Columbine was a seminal event in law enforcement.  While there had been other mass-shootings in the country, the nature of the assault on the students and faculty at Columbine High School would force a change in the decision-making process of law enforcement officers.  It was no longer appropriate to contain a suspect, call a tactical team and wait.  What the shooters at Columbine (and other similar attacks) clearly demonstrated is that they would continue to kill until forced to stop.

A new wave of “Active Shooter” tactics and training were developed across the country.  The tactics would stress speed by first responders.  In some cases it required new equipment consisting of rifle or carbine, helmet, and ballistic vest.  In most cases it required a new skill set for the “average” patrol officer.  Patrol officers would likely be the first on the scene and most active shooter protocols would call for a hasty breach and assault.

Instead of waiting to have a completed and fully rehearsed assault plan, first responders would literally move to the sound of the guns in an attempt to halt or neutralize the threat as quickly as possible.  Victims would be by-passed in order to halt the shooter as quickly as possible.

The recent Fort Hood shooting depicts a successful application of modern active shooter protocol.  Officer Kimberly Munley and her partner responded to the incident within three minutes.  Witnesses report that Officer Munley moved aggressively toward the shooter and engaged him with her pistol.  The shooter turned to face her and began returning fire.  During the exchange, Munley was hit in both legs and the wrist but stayed in the fight, striking her assailant twice more in the upper torso bringing him down.  Without her swift interdiction, the shootings would certainly have continued for some time and the number of victims would have climbed.

As active shooter training continues to mature, more and more trainers are advocating single officer entry in order to halt the attack as quickly as possible.  Advocates for this technique site numerous past active shooter situations during which the attacker quickly surrendered or committed suicide when confronted by law enforcement.  While the data used is certainly correct, I disagree with the conclusions reached.  Developing tactics which rely on your assailant to quickly surrender are frighteningly incomplete.  There is an inherent flaw in developing highly refined and narrowed tactics which presupposes the will to fight of your enemy.

While the criminal profile of active shooters continues to be refined, the profile of terrorist attacks continues to expand.  The next evolution of terrorism took place in Mumbai in 2008.  The Jedburgh Research Initiative recently completed a comprehensive study of the incident and published a reconstruction of the attack, available for download here.  While the lessons learned from Mumbai are numerous and far reaching, there are obvious implications for active shooter protocol.

The Mumbai attack changed the profile of the active shooter.  These determined terrorists were not afraid to confront police, even well-trained and well-equipped national counter-terrorism forces.  Of the 104 killed in the Mumbai attack, 18 were police officers.  Would you ask the same “average” patrol officer to confront a pair of terrorists armed with military rifles, grenades and explosives?  Alone?

If not, what is the decision point to alter tactics from a “traditional” active shooter scenario to a “terrorist” active shooter situation?  Will you divide and diffuse limited training resources by conducting separate training sessions to deal with both possibilities?

What’s needed are fundamental principle-based tactics.  Don’t waste your time teaching someone what to think.  Focus instead on teaching how to think.  Patrol officers will be bombarded with conflicting pieces of information about the threat, location, and intentions.  Their senses will be assaulted by the sights, sounds, and smells of modern urban combat.  Tactics that are appropriate for Mumbai-style attackers will work for any active shooter situation.

The Jedburgh Advanced Urban Combat Course was developed in cooperation with a Federal law enforcement agency to teach initiative-based urban combat skills.  Graduates will have the necessary skills to confront and overcome a terrorist threat.  If your active shooter training assumes that the attacker is just waiting to quit, you need to re-evaluate the lessons learned from recent terrorist incidents.

Law enforcement officers will have to refine urban combat skills to deal with an ever-evolving terrorist threat.  Any two officers from any shift need the skills to assault any building, day or night.

Don’t train on what you want.  Train on what you need.  Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive firearms training available anywhere.  It was built on the vast personal combat experience of some of the most elite special operators in the country.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

The attack was carried out by ten terrorists, all male, with ages ranging from 20-28 years old.  The attackers were led by a veteran jihadist named Ishmail Khan, who had previous operational experience in Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  Nine of the terrorists were killed during the attack and one, Kasab, was captured and debriefed by Indian authorities.

The attack was a departure from previous explosive-centered terrorist events.  The terrorists worked in teams, and primarily used small arms fire and hand grenades, although several IEDs were employed as well.  The terrorist teams seized high-profile target buildings in order to maximize casualties and psychological impact.

The incident lasted nearly 61 hours and resulted in more than 100 killed and 300 wounded.

You can download the full report here -Mumbai Reconstruction (1277).

The presentation of the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack is complete.  We are proud to offer counter-terrorism training and exercises based on the lessons learned from this violent attack.  Contact us for availability and pricing.