For the record, I just use Slap and Rack.  Adding crap to the end doesn’t make people think you’re smarter, or increase the effectiveness of clearing a malfunction.  Telling someone to “squeeze” or “bang” implies that they must do those things.  I’d hope that if you needed to clear a malfunction in order to apply violence to halt an assault, that you’ll know if you need to continue shooting.

Firearms manipulation is critical within the framework of the Combat Triad – Marksmanship, Mindset, and Tactics.  Tactics is sometimes interpreted as manipulation, or gun-handling.  I like to expand the definition to include tactics because it implies not only individual proficiency, but also proficiency as a team.  All three elements must be present to survive a lethal encounter.  All three elements must likewise be present in an effective training program.  It needs to be said that weapons manipulation should also include backup and off duty weapons.  While this may seem a simple thing, there is ample evidence to reinforce the importance of effective firearms manipulation.

During a physical struggle, an assailant fired his weapon and wounded an officer.  The officer returned fire, missing the assailant before experiencing a malfunction with his duty firearm (a semi-automatic pistol).  The officer eventually fell to the ground.  As he hit the ground, the officer lost control of his weapon and the assailant fired two more rounds one of which struck the officer before he fled.  In his own words:

“I was annoyed that the gun didn’t work anymore and I didn’t see any malfunction and it was like a twilight zone or something.  The gun functions, and, for some reason, I have missed this individual and the slide has closed.  I still have a firm grip on it.  I know I have to shoot him some more.  I haven’t hit him, and the gun doesn’t work anymore.  And, during this time, I’m falling.  I’m falling at the time, and I know I’m going to shoot some more.  I know immediately that I haven’t hit him, and I was just amazed and mystified and annoyed that the gun didn’t shoot anymore.  I knew it wasn’t a stovepipe and the slide had closed.  I have to admit, as much training as we had with malfunction drills, I did not consider doing a malfunction drill.”

The simple analysis is this:  the officer was so intent on shooting the assailant, he couldn’t do what was immediately required – slap and rack.   He violated the most basic of principles – when it’s time to shoot, you shoot; when it’s time to reload, you reload; and when it’s time to conduct a malfunction drill, you fix your gun.  It’s like Ecclesiastes chapter 3, only for gunfighters.  At the time of the shooting, the officer had over 20 years of experience in law enforcement and had served as a firearms instructor for over 12 years.  The lesson for the rest of us is clear.  During the stress and violence of an assault, years of experience or possessing the proper credentials will not deter your assailant nor will it protect you from bad training habits.  If it can happen to an experienced officer, it can happen to all of us.

Ensure that shortcuts aren’t taken in your training.  A holistic firearms training program is critical to ensure officer survival.  Marksmanship, mindset and tactics must be present in equal parts.  Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive and realistic training programs possible.  We are available to provide both training and training support to organizations desiring to advance their firearms training.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

I’m certainly no Audie Murphy and I’m definitely no Albert Einstein, but I don’t understand why we can’t use all the information available about assaults to prevent them from happening.  Researchers can tell us the age, sex, height and weight of the average law enforcement officer who is killed in the line of duty.  We can pinpoint the day of the week and time of the day, and even the activity that will statistically put a police officer at the greatest risk of assault.  But over the last 20 years, the number of law enforcement officers killed hasn’t changed.  So I’ll ask again, why can’t we train the risk out of these known hazards?

For those that know me, I’m a redneck from a small town in Florida.  I’ve never been accused of being a genius.  Having said that, I have a theory.  It’s a little half-baked at this point, but my explanation is pretty simple.  It’s laziness.  The training we receive to prepare us for violent assault isn’t perfect, but it isn’t grossly negligent either.  For the most part, our assailants are less trained and poorly equipped by our professional standards.  The training we receive is adequate (for the most part) to prepare us to deal with the hazards of the job.

What happens is that we allow our environment to condition us to expect compliance, not violence.  We ignore the things that we know are right, because they’re harder to do.  We take shortcuts.  After awhile, you begin to think that the shortcut isn’t really a shortcut because, after all, you’re still alive right?  You start to say stupid things like “I understand the streets” or “I can read people.”  It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least for a little while.  How many times do you have to get killed before you respect the risks?  Unfortunately, once you’re killed because of your laziness, you don’t get any do-overs.  You’ll be dead a long time.

I had to spend a little time in a courtroom earlier this week and a local police officer was there to offer testimony in an unrelated case.  With all respect, this officer was a victim just waiting for an obituary and a headstone.  She was fat, out of shape and she wore her gear like a person who never thought in a million years that she would need to get her weapon out quickly to defend herself.  She had her magazine pouch on her strong side, directly in front of her holster.  She had her cell phone on her support hip.  Without getting into all the tactics of reloading, I would bet half a month’s pay that she had never practiced magazine changes with her setup.  I’m sure you could train yourself to conduct reloads relatively quickly with your weak hand moving to your strong side hip, but why would you want to?

In the “Violent Encounters” study, there are case studies that reveal all manner of questionable decision making.  One that I found interesting involved a detective who worked in plainclothes and used a concealable holster for his duty weapon.  He had received a new holster from his wife for Christmas and had immediately begun using it for work (“Thanks honey, it’s exactly what I wanted”).  Well, this ill fated detective was having coffee in a diner when two men entered with the intention of robbing it.  They misidentified the detective for the manager (probably because of his suit) and approached him with weapons drawn.  Our fearless crimefighter decided that it was time for him to conduct a speed draw and engage the two assailants.  Unfortunately, the new holster was still a bit “grabby.”  The officer stated “I pulled and pulled, and the gun wouldn’t come out of the holster.  When it finally did, the whole holster came with it.  By then, I’d already been shot twice.  I dropped the gun and it fell onto the floor, still contained in the holster.”

Luckily, the officer in the case study survived.  I say it was luck, because he certainly didn’t do anything to help.  To be kind, I’ve done stupider things than not breaking in a new holster.  I’d guess that he knew better.  He probably thought about getting to the range to practice with his new holster, but he was busy.  He had responsibilities to his department and his family and he just couldn’t find the time.  I’d guess that he’d probably broken a new holster in on the job before, and probably done the same thing.  Put it on, and start carrying it.

Only this time, bad guys with guns showed up.  And his shortcut nearly cost him his life, not to mention the citizens in the diner.  Compared with the potential loss, he was taking a huge gamble.  I’m sure he would have trained more if he knew that he’d be assaulted.  And that’s the problem.  He’d been a police officer for years, been carrying concealed for years, and he’d never been attacked before.  Surely, no one will ever attack me.  I’m a nice guy and people like me.  That works until you are attacked.  And you only have to get killed once.

The bottom line on force is that the bad guy decides how much you have to use.  You don’t get to control the time, place, or circumstances of the attack.  The only thing you can control is your training before the incident, and your actions during the incident.  Your future will be determined by your present.  The training conducted today determines your future performance.  I’d ask how much training you need, but you already know the answer.  I’d ask you what skills you need to focus on, but you know the answer to that too.  Don’t let your training program give you what you want, instead force it to give you what you need.

Jedburgh Corp has developed the most innovative firearms training available anywhere.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

The purpose for defining standard procedures is to allow certain actions to be planned and rehearsed in advance.  It also allows new officers to benefit from established best practices without having to rely on trial by fire.  By practicing and perfecting these procedures, law enforcement officers are able to react quickly and appropriately.   In support of the concept of procedural training, researchers for the “Violent Encounter” study found that many officers who were assaulted reported that their departments training procedures probably saved their lives.  However, researchers also found that a number of law enforcement officers who were assaulted failed to follow correct procedures.  Examples of these include:

• Acting alone prior to the arrival of backup
• Placing vehicles improperly during traffic stops
• Failing to control violators’ actions during traffic stops
• Neglecting to notify the dispatcher of traffic stops
• Searching prisoners carelessly
• Handling prisoners without employing proper restraints

While none of these procedural omissions are directly related to firearms training, they have obvious tactical implications.  By disregarding departmental procedures, law enforcement officers establish inferior positions or place themselves at additional risk.  Once an assault commences, this inferior position can be difficult to recover from, regardless of the amount of training. What I find interesting about procedural training is that it ties together the modern combat triad; marksmanship, tactics, and mindset.  Having the proper mindset can keep you from employing bad tactics, or at least alert you to the fact that you are employing bad tactics.  Having good marksmanship is the payoff.  It allows your body to perform the desired action – eliminate the threat.

The question for the law enforcement professional is simple: what are you training your law enforcement officers to do when under stress?  The statistics are clear about procedures.  Establishing and following good procedures saves lives, and are therefore relevant to your interests.  Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive and realistic training programs possible.  We are available to provide both training and training support to organizations desiring to advance their firearms training.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Analysts can study the statistics of assaults against law enforcement personnel for years without positively impacting training.  The numbers are simply too one-dimensional: night time is more dangerous than daytime, rifles are more deadly than pistols, etc, etc, ad nauseum.   In order to advance the efficacy of training, the data must be translated into a paradigm shift.  Determining the causal relationship between the “inputs” of training and the “outputs” of actions under stress should drive improvements to training.

To deconstruct every aspect of firearms training would entail writing a series of books that someone smarter than me will have to undertake.  In order to keep the voluminous data manageable, I’ll focus on just two simple concepts: which tasks agencies choose to train and how the training is conducted.

Determining which tasks to train can seem like a straightforward process.  The selection of tasks however, is the simplest aspect of planning.  The more critical task is determining the desired endstate for each task.  As an example, lets assume that an agency is interested in accuracy as part of the firearms training program.  Sounds easy, right?  Give me officers who are accurate with their department-issued handguns.  But accuracy to what standard?  Accurate at what range?  Under what conditions?  Do officers need to be accurate while shooting on the move?  One-handed?  Weak hand?  Law enforcement leadership has a greater responsibility to their officers than just declaring “Accuracy for all!”

To a large degree, the manner in which training is conducted will determine its effectiveness.  By staying with the example of accuracy as a goal, we can illustrate this.  The simplest way to measure accuracy is to draw a bullseye on a paper target and assign point values to each ring.  The simplicity of this method is attractive to law enforcement agencies.  In fact, shooting bullseyes from 25 meters is a daily task for Special Forces soldiers during advanced firearms training courses (SFAUC, SFARTAETC).  Engaging paper targets has value, but it won’t prepare officers for a violent assault.  The unfortunate truth is that many agencies extrapolate the value of using paper targets to develop a qualification program which is simplified to the point of uselessness.  Officers engage stationary targets from stationary positions during daylight hours with minimal stress.  Standards for qualifying are so low that officers pass the “test” once a year without needing any additional training.  This approach ignores the realities of modern day gunfighting.

This entry  serves as a primer to firearms training development.  In future entries, I’ll cite case studies to highlight specific training shortfalls which may exist within law enforcement agencies nationwide.  In the meantime, I’d encourage all law enforcement professionals to begin dissecting their training programs to identify opportunities for improvement.  Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive and realistic training programs possible.  We are available to provide both training and training support to organizations desiring to advance their firearms training.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) began in 1927 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to track crime reporting and trends throughout the United States.  The UCR also enabled disparate law enforcement agencies to standardize reporting criteria for crimes.  The UCR and the actions of the IACP are the only reason that we are able to conduct analysis of trends for crime in the US.  Without it, definitions for crimes would be as diverse as the police officers who enforce our laws.

Since its inception, the UCR has been amended to keep pace with shifts in the cultural (and criminal) paradigm.  In the 1980′s, law enforcement began collecting data on crimes that appeared to be motivated by race, sexual orientation, or other factor of the victim.  The crimes were grouped together as hate crimes.  Initially the definition of these crimes wasn’t uniform and analysis of these types of crimes was impossible.  By 1990, the definition for hate crimes had been standardized and the UCR was expanded to include a category to track them.

The UCR does not currently track suicides, although most local agencies track both suicides and suicide attempts.   The American Association of Suicidology publishes national statistics on suicide.  The most recent numbers show that 30,662 people committed suicide in 2001.  No good numbers exist to show suicide attempts, but the association has developed a formula that estimates that there are 25 attempts for every 1 suicide.  This indicates that more than 765,550 people attempted suicide in 2001.

Police officers will undoubtedly encounter suspects displaying suicidal behavior.  In 1998, the American College of Emergency Physicians published a report which examined all deputy-involved shootings that occurred in the jurisdiction of Los Angeles County.  The report found that 11 percent of all deputy-involved shootings and 13 percent of all deputy-involved justifiable homicides were suicide by cop incidents.  The report concluded that suicide by cop represents an actual form of suicide.

In addition to other factors such as drugs, alcohol, and criminal experience, suicidal behavior has a strong correlation to assaults on police officers.  In “In the Line of Fire” (1997), 12 of the 42 offenders had attempted suicide prior to their assault on police.  In “Violent Encounters” 21 of the 43 offenders had previously contemplated suicide, 16 had attempted suicide, and 6 reported that they intentionally tried to force the arresting officer to kill them during the incident for which they were interviewed.  By no means do these numbers represent a wide sweeping conclusion, but they certainly indicate another factor to be considered when studying assaults on police officers.

In order to better understand the phenomenon, researchers for “Violent Encounters” propose a two-tiered investigative approach.  The officer involved in the incident represents the first tier.  His report on the incident should include analysis on whether the suspect displayed any suicidal behavior.  The second tier is a more thorough analysis conducted by an officer experienced in suicide by cop and focuses on factors that could have motivated suicidal behavior.  The result of the investigation is to better understand suicide by cop, and to understand it’s true scope in modern law enforcement encounters.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and bring Law Enforcement Training to the next level.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

All humans process the myriad of inputs and data presented to them daily by building and modifying schemas.  These schemas are sets of beliefs used as filters to assess events.  To begin the analysis on offenders, it’s important to note two key uses of their schema prior to their assault on police.  The first aspect is the diagnosis by researchers that nearly half (23 out of 50) of offenders interviewed for “Violent Encounters” had Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD).  The significance of ASPD is that these individuals see the world as a violent environment, and this perception justifies their likewise violent behavior toward police.  The second aspect of offender schema is one developed through their environment.  Offenders are essentially “trained” to deal with violent encounters through their daily life.  When one offender was asked if he’d ever been shot he replied, “Do you mean shot by the police, or shot by someone else?”  It turns out that this offender had been shot four previous times, once by police and three times by rival gang members.  What better training is there to deal with the stress of gunfighting?

Police are similarly affected by schemas.  To ignore this reality in training is both foolish and dangerous.  Foolish because it’s so obviously incorrect, and dangerous because if trainers don’t equip police officers to deal with their perceptions during stressful, potentially violent encounters they will be less prepared.  How then, do we reduce the impact of these schemas?  We train more often, and we train better. 

Without proper training, humans will respond in one of three ways.  They will fight, flee, or freeze.  The goal of training police to handle schemas is to provide additional options.  A key training aspect is the use of force continuum.  Realistic training scenarios that demand an officer to correctly perceive what is occurring will allow the officer to determine the appropriate use of force.  This training provides the officers a methodology to use in violent encounters and mitigates the influence of stress on his decision making.

Effective training paradigms for police should include:

• Adequate, realistic scenarios
• Physical and mental preparation
• Reinforcement that officers can receive a serious wound (gunshot) and continue to fight and survive
• Narratives of real life scenarios where officers survived deadly encounters

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Background Info – There were 43 offenders who participated in the study.  These offenders were interviewed (while incarcerated) in an attempt to better understand their mindset and reasoning prior to and during their assault on law enforcement.  The particular area of focus for this analysis is criminal experience, and how it was used by the offender.

Summary of Previous Entry - Of the 43 offenders, 41 of them had been previously incarcerated.  Of those, 12 had been arrested 10 times or more, and the remaining 29 had been arrested between 2 and 5 prior to imprisonment.  Offenders reported to the researchers that their previous arrests allow them to develop familiarity with various law enforcement procedures.  They also observed different law enforcement officers.  By carefully analyzing the behavior of law enforcement, offenders were able to evaluate all law enforcement officers they came in contact with (regardless of job or agency assigned).  Specifically, offenders learned to appraise how officers approach suspects, how officers handcuff and search suspects, and how officers transport prisoners.

One interpretation of the data would suggest that offenders use their experience with law enforcement to assist in the planning of their assault.  The reported motivation for offenders to assault law enforcement was overwhelmingly to escape.   I explored this theory in the last entry.

There is a second interpretation that suggests a slightly more nuanced application of experience.  As previously stated, offenders use experience to appraise law enforcement officers.  As one offender reported “I knew who was working which shift, when vice was working, who the lazy officers were, and who the hot dogs were.”

How can offenders leverage their understanding of law enforcement practices and law enforcement behavior?  If offenders are able to determine which officers are “lazy” or which officers seem unaware of their surrounding, they may also determine the victim of their assault.  There are additional resources that support this.  The primary one is entitled “Offender’s Perceptual Shorthand: what messages are law enforcement officers sending to offenders?” It was written by Edward Davis in 1999 and published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

In short, the report finds that officers send signals to potential assailants through their walk, their actions, and their general attitude.  Offenders who intended or contemplated violence cue off these indicators to select their targets.

The truth is somewhere between these two points.  Criminals do observe and evaluate law enforcement procedure and use this knowledge to benefit their illegal activities.  They also use their experience to determine which officers are “hard targets” and which officers would be easier to overcome.  Law enforcement leadership needs to acknowledge and understand the implications of these simple truths.  Criminals acknowledge that officers that follow procedures and treat them in a no-nonsense manner present a more difficult threat to them.  Likewise, officers who seem over-friendly or unaware of their surroundings present an easier target for felonious assault.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

It’s absolutely the best analysis I’ve ever come across and I can’t recommend it enough.   I’d like to break out the analysis into bite-size chunks.  Today I want to take a look at the assailants who assault officers, at least in one respect.

There were 43 offenders who participated in the study.  These offenders were interviewed (while incarcerated) in an attempt to better understand their mindset and reasoning prior to and during their assault on law enforcement.  The particular area of focus for this analysis is criminal experience, and how it was used by the offender.

Of the 43 offenders, 41 of them had been previously incarcerated.  Of those, 12 had been arrested 10 times or more, and the remaining 29 had been arrested between 2 and 5 prior to imprisonment.  In and of itself, you could use this information to make all sorts of claims about the justice system, society at large, or whatever else suits your social agenda.  What is of most interst to me is the tactical / training implications.

Offenders reported to the researchers that their previous arrests allow them to develop familiarity with various law enforcement procedures.  They also observed different law enforcement officers.  By carefully analyzing the behavior of law enforcement, offenders were able to evaluate all law enforcement officers they came in contact with (regardless of job or agency assigned).  Specifically, offenders learned to appraise how officers approach suspects, how officers handcuff and search suspects, and how officers transport prisoners.

The implications of this is that offenders are changing their assault based on the intelligence they gather.  They understand that law enforcement officers will follow procedure every time (at least theoretically).  The intent of procedure is to standardize actions for officers, and keep them safe.  The unintended consequence is predictability of actions and timing.  Offenders capitalize on this predictability.

This shouldn’t be surprising, though I’ll admit that I had never considered it.  I’ve even experienced this phenomenon first hand.  I employed tactics and conducted operations in Baghdad in 2003 that I wouldn’t dream of doing in Samarra in 2004.  The environment that I found myself in was radically different.  The overall violence level was much higher, the religious / cultural situation was different (albeit similar), and the insurgents I faced had been training and learning for a year.  They had adapted their tactics to mitigate our past operations.  I can best sum it up like this:  After the invasion of Baghdad, we killed all the really stupid ones and the really brave ones.  The only ones left were smart, deliberate, and careful.

Agencies should review their standard procedures to determine if they are keeping officers safe, or if their predictability is endangering them.  Criminals are learning and adapting to agency and law enforcement behavior.  Law enforcement may need to respond in kind.  The improvement to procedures will certainly be driven from the street level up, and leaders need to capitalize on the wealth of experience within their organization.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.