You Already Know the Answer.
Nothing that I’ve read about assault against law enforcement or discovered from the masses of emails that I receive has been truly ground breaking. At a certain level, there was nothing truly shocking about being in combat either. I remember thinking that it was louder than I thought it would be, and that it was harder to see where the bad guys were. But after I gained additional experience, I was able to view the phenomenon with a certain degree of detachment. The reactions I saw made sense to me in that environment. Put another way, combat is common sense. Hide behind things that stop bullets, shoot back, and communicate your plans and intentions to the people around you (shoot, move and communicate). The challenge is to accomplish those simple skills in a fluid and dynamic environment (someone is trying to kill you).
I’m certainly no Audie Murphy and I’m definitely no Albert Einstein, but I don’t understand why we can’t use all the information available about assaults to prevent them from happening. Researchers can tell us the age, sex, height and weight of the average law enforcement officer who is killed in the line of duty. We can pinpoint the day of the week and time of the day, and even the activity that will statistically put a police officer at the greatest risk of assault. But over the last 20 years, the number of law enforcement officers killed hasn’t changed. So I’ll ask again, why can’t we train the risk out of these known hazards?
For those that know me, I’m a redneck from a small town in Florida. I’ve never been accused of being a genius. Having said that, I have a theory. It’s a little half-baked at this point, but my explanation is pretty simple. It’s laziness. The training we receive to prepare us for violent assault isn’t perfect, but it isn’t grossly negligent either. For the most part, our assailants are less trained and poorly equipped by our professional standards. The training we receive is adequate (for the most part) to prepare us to deal with the hazards of the job.
What happens is that we allow our environment to condition us to expect compliance, not violence. We ignore the things that we know are right, because they’re harder to do. We take shortcuts. After awhile, you begin to think that the shortcut isn’t really a shortcut because, after all, you’re still alive right? You start to say stupid things like “I understand the streets” or “I can read people.” It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least for a little while. How many times do you have to get killed before you respect the risks? Unfortunately, once you’re killed because of your laziness, you don’t get any do-overs. You’ll be dead a long time.
I had to spend a little time in a courtroom earlier this week and a local police officer was there to offer testimony in an unrelated case. With all respect, this officer was a victim just waiting for an obituary and a headstone. She was fat, out of shape and she wore her gear like a person who never thought in a million years that she would need to get her weapon out quickly to defend herself. She had her magazine pouch on her strong side, directly in front of her holster. She had her cell phone on her support hip. Without getting into all the tactics of reloading, I would bet half a month’s pay that she had never practiced magazine changes with her setup. I’m sure you could train yourself to conduct reloads relatively quickly with your weak hand moving to your strong side hip, but why would you want to?
In the “Violent Encounters” study, there are case studies that reveal all manner of questionable decision making. One that I found interesting involved a detective who worked in plainclothes and used a concealable holster for his duty weapon. He had received a new holster from his wife for Christmas and had immediately begun using it for work (“Thanks honey, it’s exactly what I wanted”). Well, this ill fated detective was having coffee in a diner when two men entered with the intention of robbing it. They misidentified the detective for the manager (probably because of his suit) and approached him with weapons drawn. Our fearless crimefighter decided that it was time for him to conduct a speed draw and engage the two assailants. Unfortunately, the new holster was still a bit “grabby.” The officer stated “I pulled and pulled, and the gun wouldn’t come out of the holster. When it finally did, the whole holster came with it. By then, I’d already been shot twice. I dropped the gun and it fell onto the floor, still contained in the holster.”
Luckily, the officer in the case study survived. I say it was luck, because he certainly didn’t do anything to help. To be kind, I’ve done stupider things than not breaking in a new holster. I’d guess that he knew better. He probably thought about getting to the range to practice with his new holster, but he was busy. He had responsibilities to his department and his family and he just couldn’t find the time. I’d guess that he’d probably broken a new holster in on the job before, and probably done the same thing. Put it on, and start carrying it.
Only this time, bad guys with guns showed up. And his shortcut nearly cost him his life, not to mention the citizens in the diner. Compared with the potential loss, he was taking a huge gamble. I’m sure he would have trained more if he knew that he’d be assaulted. And that’s the problem. He’d been a police officer for years, been carrying concealed for years, and he’d never been attacked before. Surely, no one will ever attack me. I’m a nice guy and people like me. That works until you are attacked. And you only have to get killed once.
The bottom line on force is that the bad guy decides how much you have to use. You don’t get to control the time, place, or circumstances of the attack. The only thing you can control is your training before the incident, and your actions during the incident. Your future will be determined by your present. The training conducted today determines your future performance. I’d ask how much training you need, but you already know the answer. I’d ask you what skills you need to focus on, but you know the answer to that too. Don’t let your training program give you what you want, instead force it to give you what you need.
Jedburgh Corp has developed the most innovative firearms training available anywhere. Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs. Also, feel free to post your comments.
Procedural Training
Supporting our study of violence against law enforcement officers is the analysis of training. During my last post, I discussed training tasks, how they are measured, and the manner in which they are trained. To refine the discussion further, I’m looking at the role of established, standardized procedures. Using data found in the FBI study, “Violent Encounters” (available for download here – Violent Encounters (135), this idea is explored further.
The purpose for defining standard procedures is to allow certain actions to be planned and rehearsed in advance. It also allows new officers to benefit from established best practices without having to rely on trial by fire. By practicing and perfecting these procedures, law enforcement officers are able to react quickly and appropriately. In support of the concept of procedural training, researchers for the “Violent Encounter” study found that many officers who were assaulted reported that their departments training procedures probably saved their lives. However, researchers also found that a number of law enforcement officers who were assaulted failed to follow correct procedures. Examples of these include:
- Acting alone prior to the arrival of backup
- Placing vehicles improperly during traffic stops
- Failing to control violators’ actions during traffic stops
- Neglecting to notify the dispatcher of traffic stops
- Searching prisoners carelessly
- Handling prisoners without employing proper restraints
While none of these procedural omissions are directly related to firearms training, they have obvious tactical implications. By disregarding departmental procedures, law enforcement officers establish inferior positions or place themselves at additional risk. Once an assault commences, this inferior position can be difficult to recover from, regardless of the amount of training. What I find interesting about procedural training is that it ties together the modern combat triad; marksmanship, tactics, and mindset. Having the proper mindset can keep you from employing bad tactics, or at least alert you to the fact that you are employing bad tactics. Having good marksmanship is the payoff. It allows your body to perform the desired action – eliminate the threat.
The question for the law enforcement professional is simple: what are you training your law enforcement officers to do when under stress? The statistics are clear about procedures. Establishing and following good procedures saves lives, and are therefore relevant to your interests. Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive and realistic training programs possible. We are available to provide both training and training support to organizations desiring to advance their firearms training. Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs. Also, feel free to post your comments.
How We Train.
The “true north” of firearms training is the transfer of a skill or set of skills. These skills are used by law enforcement officers to respond to threats, both real and perceived. Topics that receive the most attention will be retained at a much higher degreee than topics that are not reinforced. In the penultimate FBI study, “Violent Encounters” (available for download here – Violent Encounters (135)), the chapter on training and procedures encapsulate the core challenges faced by both law enforcement officers and their trainers. Using a certain lens, the entire study becomes a postmortem of modern law enforcement training methodologies.
Analysts can study the statistics of assaults against law enforcement personnel for years without positively impacting training. The numbers are simply too one-dimensional: night time is more dangerous than daytime, rifles are more deadly than pistols, etc, etc, ad nauseum. In order to advance the efficacy of training, the data must be translated into a paradigm shift. Determining the causal relationship between the “inputs” of training and the “outputs” of actions under stress should drive improvements to training.
To deconstruct every aspect of firearms training would entail writing a series of books that someone smarter than me will have to undertake. In order to keep the voluminous data manageable, I’ll focus on just two simple concepts: which tasks agencies choose to train and how the training is conducted.
Determining which tasks to train can seem like a straightforward process. The selection of tasks however, is the simplest aspect of planning. The more critical task is determining the desired endstate for each task. As an example, lets assume that an agency is interested in accuracy as part of the firearms training program. Sounds easy, right? Give me officers who are accurate with their department-issued handguns. But accuracy to what standard? Accurate at what range? Under what conditions? Do officers need to be accurate while shooting on the move? One-handed? Weak hand? Law enforcement leadership has a greater responsibility to their officers than just declaring “Accuracy for all!”
To a large degree, the manner in which training is conducted will determine its effectiveness. By staying with the example of accuracy as a goal, we can illustrate this. The simplest way to measure accuracy is to draw a bullseye on a paper target and assign point values to each ring. The simplicity of this method is attractive to law enforcement agencies. In fact, shooting bullseyes from 25 meters is a daily task for Special Forces soldiers during advanced firearms training courses (SFAUC, SFARTAETC). Engaging paper targets has value, but it won’t prepare officers for a violent assault. The unfortunate truth is that many agencies extrapolate the value of using paper targets to develop a qualification program which is simplified to the point of uselessness. Officers engage stationary targets from stationary positions during daylight hours with minimal stress. Standards for qualifying are so low that officers pass the “test” once a year without needing any additional training. This approach ignores the realities of modern day gunfighting.
This entry serves as a primer to firearms training development. In future entries, I’ll cite case studies to highlight specific training shortfalls which may exist within law enforcement agencies nationwide. In the meantime, I’d encourage all law enforcement professionals to begin dissecting their training programs to identify opportunities for improvement. Jedburgh Corp has developed the most comprehensive and realistic training programs possible. We are available to provide both training and training support to organizations desiring to advance their firearms training. Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs. Also, feel free to post your comments.
