Experience of Offender – Redux

In a previous entry, we looked at the impact of the experience of offenders during their assault on law enforcement officers.  The data for the analysis can be found in the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance report entitled “Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on Our Nation’s Law Enforcement Officers.”   It’s available for download here: Violent Encounters (135)

Background Info – There were 43 offenders who participated in the study.  These offenders were interviewed (while incarcerated) in an attempt to better understand their mindset and reasoning prior to and during their assault on law enforcement.  The particular area of focus for this analysis is criminal experience, and how it was used by the offender.

Summary of Previous Entry - Of the 43 offenders, 41 of them had been previously incarcerated.  Of those, 12 had been arrested 10 times or more, and the remaining 29 had been arrested between 2 and 5 prior to imprisonment.  Offenders reported to the researchers that their previous arrests allow them to develop familiarity with various law enforcement procedures.  They also observed different law enforcement officers.  By carefully analyzing the behavior of law enforcement, offenders were able to evaluate all law enforcement officers they came in contact with (regardless of job or agency assigned).  Specifically, offenders learned to appraise how officers approach suspects, how officers handcuff and search suspects, and how officers transport prisoners.

One interpretation of the data would suggest that offenders use their experience with law enforcement to assist in the planning of their assault.  The reported motivation for offenders to assault law enforcement was overwhelmingly to escape.   I explored this theory in the last entry.

There is a second interpretation that suggests a slightly more nuanced application of experience.  As previously stated, offenders use experience to appraise law enforcement officers.  As one offender reported “I knew who was working which shift, when vice was working, who the lazy officers were, and who the hot dogs were.”

How can offenders leverage their understanding of law enforcement practices and law enforcement behavior?  If offenders are able to determine which officers are “lazy” or which officers seem unaware of their surrounding, they may also determine the victim of their assault.  There are additional resources that support this.  The primary one is entitled “Offender’s Perceptual Shorthand: what messages are law enforcement officers sending to offenders?” It was written by Edward Davis in 1999 and published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

In short, the report finds that officers send signals to potential assailants through their walk, their actions, and their general attitude.  Offenders who intended or contemplated violence cue off these indicators to select their targets.

The truth is somewhere between these two points.  Criminals do observe and evaluate law enforcement procedure and use this knowledge to benefit their illegal activities.  They also use their experience to determine which officers are “hard targets” and which officers would be easier to overcome.  Law enforcement leadership needs to acknowledge and understand the implications of these simple truths.  Criminals acknowledge that officers that follow procedures and treat them in a no-nonsense manner present a more difficult threat to them.  Likewise, officers who seem over-friendly or unaware of their surroundings present an easier target for felonious assault.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Violent Encounters – Experience of Offender

In 2006, the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance published an integrative report entitled “Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on Our Nation’s Law Enforcement Officers.”   It’s available for download here: Violent Encounters (135)

It’s absolutely the best analysis I’ve ever come across and I can’t recommend it enough.   I’d like to break out the analysis into bite-size chunks.  Today I want to take a look at the assailants who assault officers, at least in one respect.

There were 43 offenders who participated in the study.  These offenders were interviewed (while incarcerated) in an attempt to better understand their mindset and reasoning prior to and during their assault on law enforcement.  The particular area of focus for this analysis is criminal experience, and how it was used by the offender.

Of the 43 offenders, 41 of them had been previously incarcerated.  Of those, 12 had been arrested 10 times or more, and the remaining 29 had been arrested between 2 and 5 prior to imprisonment.  In and of itself, you could use this information to make all sorts of claims about the justice system, society at large, or whatever else suits your social agenda.  What is of most interst to me is the tactical / training implications.

Offenders reported to the researchers that their previous arrests allow them to develop familiarity with various law enforcement procedures.  They also observed different law enforcement officers.  By carefully analyzing the behavior of law enforcement, offenders were able to evaluate all law enforcement officers they came in contact with (regardless of job or agency assigned).  Specifically, offenders learned to appraise how officers approach suspects, how officers handcuff and search suspects, and how officers transport prisoners.

The implications of this is that offenders are changing their assault based on the intelligence they gather.  They understand that law enforcement officers will follow procedure every time (at least theoretically).  The intent of procedure is to standardize actions for officers, and keep them safe.  The unintended consequence is predictability of actions and timing.  Offenders capitalize on this predictability.

This shouldn’t be surprising, though I’ll admit that I had never considered it.  I’ve even experienced this phenomenon first hand.  I employed tactics and conducted operations in Baghdad in 2003 that I wouldn’t dream of doing in Samarra in 2004.  The environment that I found myself in was radically different.  The overall violence level was much higher, the religious / cultural situation was different (albeit similar), and the insurgents I faced had been training and learning for a year.  They had adapted their tactics to mitigate our past operations.  I can best sum it up like this:  After the invasion of Baghdad, we killed all the really stupid ones and the really brave ones.  The only ones left were smart, deliberate, and careful.

Agencies should review their standard procedures to determine if they are keeping officers safe, or if their predictability is endangering them.  Criminals are learning and adapting to agency and law enforcement behavior.  Law enforcement may need to respond in kind.  The improvement to procedures will certainly be driven from the street level up, and leaders need to capitalize on the wealth of experience within their organization.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

The Mind of a Shooter

Today, I want to take a break from the Uniform Crime Reports assembled by the FBI.  I’ve been reading a study conducted by David Klinger, Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri-Saint Louis.  The study was contracted by the Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice.  The study is entitled “Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings.”  It’s available for download here: Police Response to OIS (11).

The intent of the study is to examine the consequences for officers who pull the trigger.  I’d like to focus on what officers involved in shootings reported to have thought or felt as they fired their weapon, or immediately after firing their weapon.  Of the 80 police officers interviewed for the study, 96% of them experienced at least one specific thought or feeling.  Here’s the data breakdown:

• Fear for others – 49%
• Strength, adrenalin rush – 46%
• Disbelief – 34%
• Fear for self – 30%
• Need to survive – 23%
• Intrusive thoughts – 9%
• Other specific thoughts – 30%

Of the officers who experienced “other” thoughts or feelings, the list includes being angry at the suspect, concern that the shots being fired were justified, concern that the suspect did not go down after being hit by the first round, and a sense of confusion over what happened because they did not realize they had fired their weapon.

Understanding the role of fear for self and others should be part of any comprehensive training program.  What I’d like to examine in greater detail is the “other” category.  Whenever a researcher has an “other” category that is larger than other “named” categories, it means that the questions they asked weren’t as good as they’d hoped.

What’s most concerning to me from a training standpoint is that officers are concerned about the justification of the shooting while they’re shooting.  Police departments need to address a culture that has law enforcement officers worried about legal ramifications while in the midst of a deadly force encounter.  The other, more salient, issue is that police officers are concerned that the assailant is not being knocked down when struck by their rounds.  This speaks directly to firearms training that is wholly incomplete.  What I suspect is that police officers are trained on paper targets to fire some number of rounds (probably one or two) before ending the engagement.

There is voluminous data available about the ballistics of handgun rounds.  This data should be leveraged into firearms training.  LEOs need to conduct training that most closely mimics a true deadly force encounter.  Put simply, use paper targets for marksmanship, but look to other alternatives when conducting tactical or scenario driven training.  There are a host of solutions ranging from technologically sophisticated (computerized targets with random round counts) to completely simple (using inflated balloons).

Training officers need to conduct training that prepares officers to survive and win deadly force encounters, and law enforcement leaders need to conduct a culutural study to discover why officers are worrying about justification of shooting instead of surviving.  Both trends are disturbing, but easily correctable.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Gunfighting Distance

During previous analysis of the FBI’s 2007 Crime Statistics (Uniform Crime Reports) we’ve gained better understanding of the factors of time, circumstances, weapons, experience (of LEO), and assignment as it relates to law enforcement officers being assaulted and killed.  Today I want to focus on the assaults in which LEOs were killed by firearms and specifically at what distances the assaults occurred.

As with all previous analysis conducted by Jedburgh, the intent is not to Monday-morning quarterback a particular engagement, but rather to ensure that training methodologies account for the realities of perfoming law enforcement duties.  To set the stage, there were 55 LEOs killed by firearms in 2007, and 508 over the last ten years.  Far and away, handguns were used most often (see previous post on weapons for details).  Handguns have natural advantages of size and ease of concealment, with disadvantages of reduced power and accuracy.

Following is the data for 2007 (with data from ten years in paretheses):

• LEOs killed with firearms – 55 (508)
• Distance 0-5 ft – 27 (254)
• Distance 6-10 ft – 10 (95)
• Distance 11-20 ft – 6 (57)
• Distance 21-50 ft 5 (40)
• Distance over 50 ft 4 (38)
• Distance not reported – 3 (24)

Fully half (50%) of all LEOs killed in the last ten years were within 5 feet of their attacker, and nearly 70% were killed within 10 feet.  In range training, that’s just over the 3 yard line.

I know that the good guys are not in a position to dictate the time, place, or distance of engagements.  It’s only prudent to continue training at all effective handgun ranges (out to 25 yards).  However, it’s foolish and irresponsible to ignore these numbers.  Let me say it again.  Nearly 70% of all law enforcement officers killed during the last ten years died within 10 feet of their attacker.

LEOs need to get down and dirty at the range inside the 10 feet distance.  Training should be focused on identifying the threat, rapid weapon draw, and precision marksmanship.  Leveraging previous data, we also know that arrest situations account for the majority of LEO deaths.  Using these two data points, it’s obvious that a comprehensive review of arrest procedures and firearms training is needed.

Jedburgh Corp offers the finest firearms training in the world, with programs specifically designed for LEOs that capitalize on the most current intelligence available.  Please contact info@Jedburgh-USA.com to discuss your training needs.

LEO Body Armor Use

What were Law Enforcement Officers wearing when they were assaulted and killed? No, it won’t be the next challenge for a fashion reality show to design a pink uniform that promotes harmony.

There were 57 LEOs reported killed in 2007. Of those, 41 were in uniform at the time.  Of these uniformed LEOs 33 were wearing body armor and 40 were wearing holsters.  Sixteen LEOs were not in uniform at the time of the assault, but 3 of them were in body armor and 11 of them were wearing holsters.

What about the averages from the last ten years?  Well, in that regard 2007 was pretty unremarkable.  Most LEOs killed were wearing uniforms at the time (77% over the last ten years).  Most LEOs were wearing body armor (61%).  Sadly, what is also normal is that 1 or 2 officers in uniform were assaulted and killed when they were not wearing their holster.  Only slightly less ridiculous is that 31% of LEOs not in uniform (and 40% over the last ten years) weren’t carrying their holster when they were killed.  Doesn’t really matter how well trained you are with your firearm if you don’t have it when the bad man comes, does it?

It isn’t my intention to begin an analysis of whether body armor makes LEOs safer.  Wearing it is a good thing.  It’s relevant to your interests as a professional.  What is worth commenting on is the fact that LEOs wearing body armor were nsvertheless assaulted and killed in 2007.  Criminals are clearly not so intimidated by an LEO in body armor that he acquiesces without firing a shot.

What I would like to examine are the weapons/ammunition that defeated body armor worn by law enforcement officers.  For handguns, the analysis is simple.  Over the last ten years, there was one incident in 2005 in which a law enforcement officer’s vest was penetrated by a 9mm round fired from a handgun.  All in all, the risk from handguns is relatively low (if the bad guy manages to hit the plate).  Rifles are a different matter.  In the last ten years there were 19 incidents in which rifle rounds defeated LEO body armor.  Here are the calibers used:

• .223 caliber – 2
• .30 caliber – 1
• .30-06 caliber – 2
• .30-30 caliber – 2
• .300 caliber – 1
• .308 caliber – 1
• 5.56 mm – 1
• 7 mm – 1
• 7.62×39 mm – 8

When law enforcement officers are confronting a suspect armed with a rifle, extreme care must be taken.  It is 19 times more likely that even if struck in the plate, the rifle catridge will defeat body armor.

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and provide the most effective Law Enforcement Training available.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.

Weapons used in LEO assaults

Today’s analysis involves weapons used in felony murder of LEOs.  It includes both type of firearm and caliber used.  First, let’s take a look at the preferred weapon of the criminal who assault LEOs.  Of the 57 LEOs killed in 2007, 55 were killed with firearms and of those 38 were killed with handguns.  Here’s the high-level breakdown of weapons used in 2007:

• Total LEOs Feloniously Killed – 57
• Total Firearms – 55 (96%)
• Handgun – 38 (67%)
• Rifle – 8 (14%)
• Shotgun – 8 (14%)
• Type Firearm not Reported – 1 (2%)
• Other weapon (vehicle) – 2 (4 %)

And here’s the numbers from the last ten years (1998-2007):

• Total LEOs Feloniously Killed – 549
• Total Firearms - 508 (93%)
• Handgun - 368 (67%)
• Rifle - 101 (18%)
• Shotgun - 38 (7%)
• Other weapon (Vehicle) - 33 (6 %)
• Other weapon (Knife) – 4 (<1%)
• Other weapon (Bomb) – 1 (<1%)
• Other weapon (Blunt object) – 2 (<1%)

What the data shows conclusively is that firearms in general and handguns specifically represent the greatest risk of death to LEOs.  Not exactly breaking news, but it helps paint a picture of the threat to LEOs.  Digging a little deeper, although with questionable significance, the following is a breakdown of the caliber used in felony assaults on LEOs in 2007 (ten year numbers in paretheses): 

LEOs killed with handguns – 38 (368)

• .22 caliber – 3 (20)
• .22 magnum – 1 (1)
• .25 caliber – 4 (11)
• .32 caliber – 2 (8)
• .357 caliber – 0 (19)
• .357 magnum – 1 (11)
• .38 caliber -5 (41)
• .380 caliber – 2 (31)
• .40 caliber – 2 (57)
• .41 magnum -0 (1)
• .44 caliber – 0 (2)
• .44 magnum – 0 (6)
• .45 caliber – 5 (42)
• .50 caliber – 0 (2)
• 7.62×25 mm – 0 (1)
• 9mm – 10 (102)
• Handgun caliber not reported – 3 (9)

LEOs killed with rifles – 8 (101)

• .22 caliber – 0 (3)
• .223 caliber – 2 (18)
• .25-06 caliber – 0 (2)
• .270 caliber - 0 (2)
• .30 caliber – 0 (8)
• .30-06 caliber – 3 (6)
• .30-30 caliber – 0 (5)
• .300 caliber – 0 (1)
• .308 caliber – 1 (1)
• .44 caliber – 0 (1)
• 5.56 mm – 0 (1)
• 7mm – 0 (3)
• 7.62×39 mm – 2 (45)
• 7.62×54R mm – 0 (1)
• Rifle caliber not reported – 0 (4)

LEOs killed with shotguns – 8 (38)

• 12 Gauge – 7 (34)
• 16 Gauge – 0 (1)
• 20 Gauge – 1 (2)
• Shotgun caliber not reported – 0 (1)

In terms of training or mindset, there is little to takeaway from this data.  What’s worth noting is that the handgun caliber used most often is the 9mm, and the rifle caliber used most often is the 7.62×39 mm.  It seems that even criminals understand the utility of these military calibers.

Due to the lack of substantive conclusions from today’s work, lets take this opportunity to review the past two weeks of postings.  Law Enforcement Officers are in the greatest risk on Thursday through Saturday nights (50% of killings occurred on these days), particularly between 6pm and 2am (49% occurred during this timeframe).  Arrests and ambush situations are easily the most dangerous tasks for LEOs (56% occurred conducting these activities).  Officers with 1-5 years of experience account for 30% of officers killed, and officers with 6-10 years of experience likewise accounting for 30%.  The average age for LEOs killed was 37 and the average amount of experience was 10 years.  Most officers killed (61%) had another officer on-scene to assist.

In terms of training LEOs should focus on no-light and low-light tactics, arrest procedures should be modified / updated, refresher training should be conducted for “experienced” officers, and tactics throughout the department should be standardized to allow assisting officers to more fully protect arresting officers. 

Jedburgh Corp offers a wide range of courses specifically designed to leverage this data, and bring Law Enforcement Training to the next level.  Contact us at info@Jedburgh-USA.com to provide feedback on the blog, or discuss your training needs.  Also, feel free to post your comments.